Despite the defeat in World War I, the German officer corps in the interwar period still saw the main means of victory in the future war in an offensive operation. Thus, it took away from World War I a different experience than its French counterpart. Based on the experience of 1914-1918, including the infiltration tactics used by the Stoßstruppen troops, and noting the intensive development of aviation and armored weapons, part of the German officer corps (for example, General Heinz Guderian) developed the theoretical prerequisites for the so-called lightning war (German: Blitzkrieg), that is, the desire to defeat the enemy in one decisive offensive operation, carried out in the shortest possible time and with the maximum intensity of forces and resources. The German officer corps also trained in accordance with this offensive doctrine of war in the 1930s and during the world war. It is also worth adding that German officers at almost all levels during World War II used the principle of so-called command by task (German Auftragstaktik), that is, they outlined to their subordinates the task that needed to be completed and the forces that were at their disposal, while the execution of the task depended entirely on them. This model of command, based on very well and equally trained officers, led to the fact that the German army was very flexible in its actions and could react faster at different levels than its opponents (for example, the French army during the 1940 campaign or the Soviet army in 1941). This system proved successful (especially at lower levels) throughout World War II. It is also worth adding that many outstanding commanders served in the German officer corps from World War II, including: Erich von Manstein, Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel and Walter Model.
